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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
MARGARET DOOLY OLWELL, 
et al., 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
THOMAS A. CLARK, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPON~ENTS' BRIEF O~ 
PETITI0N FOR REHEA~ING 
Case No. 17595 
The respondents respectfully petition this Honorable 
Court for: 
I. A rehearing, or that failing: 
II. For an amendment of the remand portion of the 
judgment, to include an order for determination of the amount 
of contribution for which the appellants should contribute for 
expense and taxes assessed to the property and paid by the re-
spondents. 
In discussing request No. I, respondents seek the 
indulgence of the Court briefly to review the majority opinion, 
in the hope they may suggest possible errors in interpretation 
of the purpose of the adverse possession legislation and author-
ities cited as applied to the facts of this case. sufficient to 
entertain a rehearing. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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For what it may be worth, it appears that the deci-
sion in asserting that the claim here is against a co-tenant, 
technically is incorrect, since the claim actually is against 
a tenant in common. There are times when the difference be-
tween the two tenancies could, in a given case, lead to diver-
gent results. 
The opinion observes that, that except for one in-
stance where a Trust Deed stated it was a transfer of "all" 
the property, instead of the one-sixth really involved in this 
case, the remaining documents of transfer dealt only with a one-
sixth interest. We confess the error which is subject to re-
formation, but of no consequence in this case, except one. The 
error, however, in and of itself, is itself important, since 
it represented a claim to all of the April claim, not just one-
sixth, and having been made in a document that was duly re-
corded, it was adverse to the one-sixth interest claimed by 
appellants, and it constituted a "notice" to the world, in-
cluding the appellants, of an adverse claim in their one-sixth 
asserted interest. This one circumstance, it is respectfully 
suggested, renders the position taken in the majority opinion, 
that there was no evidence of such notice or "bringing the claim 
of adverse possession home to the Schulders," something short 
of complete accuracy. The very purpose of the Recording Acts 
is to impart notice to the record owners of property, of error 
or other facts appearing on the public record impeaching on~'s 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
title. Since the decision is based solely on lack of notice, 
the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. This error 
remained on the public record for years, during which time 
appellants took no action to attack the claim. 
In appellants' First Defense they asserted that 
respondents' use was not open and notorious but if so, it was 
with appellants' consent, and not in accord with the adverse 
possession legislation, - an issue to be tried. The case was 
tried, and neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court found 
any merit in the alleged defense. Had there been no findin~ 
on the question of notoriety and consent, under the Supreme 
Court's recent pronouncement in Jones v. Hinkle, Utah, 611 P.2d 
1 
733 (1980) appellants clearly are foreclosed from a favorable 
judgment by failing to present specific evidence by affidavit, 
or otherwise, though they had full opportunity to do so: 
Pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, when a motion for summary 
judgment is made, the affidavit of an ad-
verse party must contain specific eviden-
tiary facts showing that there is a genu~ne 
issue for trial. Walker v. Rocky ~ountain 
Recreation Corp., 29 Utah Zd 274, 508 P.2d 
538 (1973); Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 
436 P.2d 1021 (1968). Defendants have failed 
to identify with specificity any material 
issue of fact, and plaintiff, as a matt7r of 
law, is entitled to conveyance of the title. 
The judgment of the trial court i~ i~ er~or; 
indeed, the record shows that plaintiff is 
entitled to summary judgment in her favor. 
As to the Second Defense - that the taxes paid by 
1. Also Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah Zd 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960) 
and a number of other subsequent cases. 
-3-
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respondents were made by them "voluntarily," such defense is 
without merit, for several reasons: Those mentioned in the 
foregoing paragraph for failure of proof by affidavit or other-
wise, and also because. in statutory adverse possession cases, 
whether the taxes are paid voluntarily or not is of no moment. 
The appellants' pleading consists of one short doc'1-
ment, - an "Answer," - and at most it is a denial without 
supporting affidavits reciting specific facts creating a 
triable issue, that if proved, would constitute an affirma-
tive defense. 
The facts supporting the trial court's judgment, 
clearly show that for nearly 70 years, appellants offered no 
reimbursement of taxes, did nothing to protect the property 
as had the respondents, nor did they even list the property 
along with other listed mining property in the inventory of 
the estate of the Schulder grantee and alleged owner, filed 
over 40 years ago, and still unlisted, all reflecting an 
abandonment of their claim with the intention so to do. 
Such silence, absence of attention to one's prop-
erty, and actual neglect in failing to list it as an asset 
in the estate, together with the universally accepted pre-
sumptions as to settling rights by passage of a long period 
of time, that of establishing certainty of title by pre-
suming a lost grant, abandonment, and others, are as weighty 
in the scales of equity, as is the spoken word. 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
All of the above can lead to no conclusion other 
than some time over a 68 year period, the appellants or one 
of them had "notice," or "knowledge" of, or "reasonably should 
have known" of an adverse user, the most likely of which would 
be a tenant in common, who, if one but looked at the tax 
roll, would have found Ernest Bamberger or his successors who, 
by the public record, clearly have been the payors of the 
taxes during the entire span of 68 years. The trial judge, 
in entering the judgment now reversed, presumably weighed 
the evidence, applied appropriate legislation, without any 
abuse of discretion. Under such circumstances, the Supreme 
Court many times has said that which universally is axiomatic: 
That the trial court's findings and judgment will not be re-
versed except for a clear showing of abuse of discretion. No-
where in the majority opinion has any such abuse been refer-
enced. 
Citation for the principles stated is unnecessary. 
However, the time-honored and often-quoted case of Stanley v. 
Stanley, 94 P.2d 465 (Utah 1939) reflects the position of the 
cases re-stated repeatedly over the years. 
Apropos generally of the substantive law relating 
to what is adequate "notice" necessary in tenancy-in-common 
cases, is a case cited in the Court's own decision in McCready 
v. Frederickson, which we espouse, found in 41 Utah 388, 126 
P. 316 (1912), which quotes from Elder v. McClaskey, 70 Fed. 
2. fhe appellants rely as heavily on the McCready case, which 
they consider dispositive here. It is the application of the 
exhaustive principles restated to the application of the facts 
of this case, which provoked this action, the lower court's 
judgment, its appeal, the reversal and now the petition for 
rehearing. 
-5-
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542, a leading case, as follows: 
It is not necessary for him (tenant) 
to give actual notice of the ouster. He 
must, in the language of the authorities, 
bring it home to his co-tenant. But he may 
do this ~ conduct the implication of which 
cannot escape the notice of the world about 
him, or of any one, though not a resident in 
the neighborhood, who has an interest in the 
property, and exercises that degree of atten-
tion in respect to what rsllis that tT!e law 
presumes in every owner. 
The decision in this case is not entirely accurate 
in appraising the very basis upon which it was written, in 
light of the purpose and wording of Rule 56. The opinion 
states that: 
The Rule itself sets the criteria for 
judgment: a party may receive the judgment re-
quested if (a) the pleadings and affidavits, 
if any show no issue as to any material fact, 
and (b) the party [sic] is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law ... Where the party 
opposed to the motion submits no documents in 
opposition, the moving party may be granted~ 
summary judgment only "if appropriate," that 
is if he is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
The word "moving," which appears before "party" 
in the Rule, apparently was omitted by mistake in the above 
quotation. However, its omission lends a different complex-
ion to the application of the Rule to this case. The "mov-
ing" party mentioned in the Rule is Bamberger, who is the 
beneficiary of the phrase "entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." The Rule does not say that the non-movant, in this 
case Schulder, is "entitled to judgment in his favor as a 
-6-
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matter of law." In other words, the Rule, under such circum-
stances does not entitle Schulder, no party to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, to a judgment quieting title to the prop-
erty in him. 
Such a result, however, appears to be the end-
product of the decision which remands the case "for entry of 
judgment for the appellants." The decision virtually quiets 
title in Schulder based on facts actually presented by the 
respondents, not the appellants. The opinion says such facts 
are insufficient to show title in Bambergers for only one 
reason, lack of notice, but sufficient to prove title in 
someone else. It is submitted that on appeal the decision at 
least should have been against Bambergers but not for Schulders, 
who filed no counterclaim, offered no proof whatever and even 
did no~ ask for any specific property nor did they even des-
cribe the property they might claim. It is suggested that 
if it still be the concensus of a majority that respondents 
failed in proof, there should be a remand to modify, with 
instructions to determine and adjudge the amount due from 
appellants to respondents as contribution for the taxes and 
expenses made by respondents, in line with the universally 
accepted principle that equity requires such contribution. 
The opinion, as evidenced by the quote above con-
cedes that Rule 56 authorizes judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs "if the pleadings and affidavits show no issue as to 
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any material fact." However, it minimizes the importance of 
the word "pleadings," which is an equal conjunctive in Rule 
56, and accepts nothing in the affidavits as reflective that 
"notice" was given, or that appellants had "knowledge of," 
or "reasonably should have known of" the adverse claiJTl. It 
seems to have ignored the fact that Sec. 78-40-13, U.C.A. 
requiring a trial in quiet title actions, with the taking of 
evidence and entering Findings, expressly was employed and 
its provisions satisfied in this case. 
Based upon the facts "pleaded," an examination of 
the documentary evidence of title introduced, taxes paid, 
saving the property from forced tax sale, notoriety of owner-
ship and the community, abandonment of claim by the tenant-
in-common, and reviewing the memoranda of authorities and 
hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court took the 
matter under advisement. Based on the evidence adduced, 
complemented by respondents' "Motion for Summary Judgment" 
and on the Pleadings, the Court entered Findings. Conclusions 
and Judgment in favor of Bambergers, which, under well kn01·m 
principles, presumptively were correct. 
No objection was made to the Findings, or the Con-
clusions of the Judgment, based on any ground, including in-
sufficiency of the evidence. No Motion to Amend was filed 
under Rule 52(b), based on that or any other ground, and no 
Motion for a new Trial was made under Rule 59, based on that 
or any other ground. Under such circumstances a judgment 
generally is affirmed on appeal. based on a presumptive cor-
-8-
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rectness, of the pleadings and record. The decision in this 
case being bottomed on "lack of notice," and the appeal not 
stating specifically such issue on appeal, and the opinion 
being specifically directed to such contentions, appears to 
have raised it sua sponte, without the solicitation of the 
losing party. 
Parenthetically, a footnote in the opinion suggests 
that "The determination that respondents' conduct constituted 
adverse possession with adequate notice is not a finding of 
fact but a conclusion of law." Respondents respectfully 
suggest this is a matter of debate, since "conduct" is an 
important and necessary fact in order to prove adverse pas-
session, as is the seven-year period, payment of the taxes, 
etc. The adverse possession statutes primarily are based on 
proof of such facts, and in large part treat "presumptions" 
as fact, as does the majority opinion, which states: 
Sec. 78-12-7 is Utah's adverse possession 
statute, setting forth the preposition that 
possession of real property is presumed to 
be in the legal title holder and that occu-
pancy by any other is deemed subordinate. 
unless the occupant can show that the property 
is held and possessed for seven years. 
The above statement appears to have been made in 
support of Schulder, as title holder. The knife cuts both 
ways, however, since Bamberger also is a title holder. to 
which the presumption applies. He, however, has the better 
side of the presumption and merit, by proof of active occu-
pancv. - which Schulder has never claimed or asserted by 
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pleaded fact, counter-affidavit or otherwise. 
Since the opinion bases its decision on actual 
4 
notice, citing the case it relies on primarily, that says 
notice must be given to a tenant-in-common by acts (conduct) 
of the "most open and notorious" character, it is only fair 
that the rest of the paragraph from which the phrase is lisLed 
should be referred to, which reflects the real gist of the 
requirement, especially as to property rights in unpopulated 
areas and asserted over a long period of time, to the effect 
that: 
"It is not necessary for him to give 
actual notice of this ouster of disseising 
of his cotenant, to him. He must, in the 
language of the authorities, 'bring it home 
to his cotenant.' But he may do this by 
conduct, the implication of which cannot 
escape the notice of the world about him, 
or of anyone, who has an interest in the 
property, and exerCISeS-that degree-of 
attention, in respect to what is his that 
the law presumes in everyone." 
We earnestly contend that upon the trial and under 
Rule 56, the facts pleaded, presented at trial and shown by 
affidavits, depositions and appellants' admissions, fully 
justified the judgment entered by the trial court. In aid of 
such contention, it is pointed out that: 
The pleading (complaint) asserted that a) the Re-
spondents occupied, and claimed the property adversely for 
more than a half century; b) paid the taxes for the required 
statutory time; and that appellants did not assert, but 
4. McCready v. Frederickson, supra, quoting Elder v. 
McClaskey. 
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abandoned any claim to the land (by filing no claim thereto 
in the tenant-in-common's Estate.) 
The maps (Ex. P-11) show that the Silver Queen claim 
abuts the April claim, but that it was excluded by the Patent 
(Ex. P-4); that it is owned by United Park City Mines, whose 
Secretary-Treasurer, Mr. Osika, employed for 35 years, by the 
United Park City Mines, gave his deposition (Ex. P-2), intro-
duced in evidence, without objection, and by affidavit attached 
to the pleadings, without objection, and testified that since 
the Eighties, Ernest Bamberger "laid claim to these properties 
(Several, including the April) over that period of time: and 
that "most of these claims had a monument of sorts which 
pretty well disappeared," that he noticed there had been a 
road that bisected the April, which is used occasionally, and 
that the area is pretty much the same as it was 50 or 60 years 
ago and that he has never heard of anyone else making claim to 
the property; that his employer, United Park had stipulated, as 
owners, of the Silver Queen, with respondents, as owners, of 
the April, settling their boundaries and that he and the otr~r 
officials of the Company considered and treated the Bambergers 
as sole owners of the abutting April claim. 
Mr. Dixon signed an affidavit which was introduced 
in evidence without objection or counter-affidavit, who testi-
fied he had been an employee of Bambergers over twenty years 
as Controller and would be the person who would receive claims 
of interest in the subject property; that he had received 
-11-
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none; that Ernest Bamberger claimed the property shown on 
the tax notices as his own, sole property. 
An affidavit was executed and filed without objec-
tion, by William H. Olwell, Secretary Treasurer of the re-
spondent Bamberger charitable Foundation in which, under oath, 
he stated that as such Secretary and also as co-executor of 
Ernest Bamberger's widow's Estate, and representative of the 
heirs, he knew the taxes were paid by respondents since 1958, 
and that he has been approached by a number of prospective 
purchasers in the area, as sole representation of the re-
spondents, as sole owners of the property, without recognizing 
any other claimant to the property. 
A letter from Ernest Bamberger's accountant to the 
Summit County Treasurer, was attached to the complaint, re-
sisting a Tax Notice to the effect that the April had been 
sold for taxes, followed by a hearing before the County Com-
mission, who vacated the sale and thus preserved the prop-
erty solely for Ernest Bamberger. 
The tax notices (Ex. P) show payment of all taxes 
since 1912, except for the year 1942, when it was necessary 
for Bamberger's accountant to appear before the County Com-
missioners, who at an open meeting, whose minutes were recorded 
and constituted notice of Mr. Bamberger's claim to the prop-
erty entered an order crediting him with payment of the taxes 
for 1942 and vacating the sale of the property theretofore 
made. 
-12-
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Under such circumstances, it is urged that the 
Schulders' "had notice," or "knowledge of" or "reasonably 
should have known" of the adverse claim, under the cases cited 
in the majority opinion itself, which recognizes that actual 
notice is not an absolute, nor an unconditional necessity to 
acquire title by adverse possession against a tenant-in-
comrnon, - which was the type of tenancy considered in such 
cases. The case most relied on by the opinion which concedes 
that actual notice is unnecessary, is Mc Cready v. Frederick-
son, followed by Clotworthy v. Clyde, Herselt v. Herselt and 
Bergstrom v. Bergstrom. 
The evidence in the case, coupled with the presump-
tions having the stature of evidence, found in the various 
adverse possession statutes, such as that mentioned in the 
opinion, Sec. 78-12-7, and in 78-12-9, where adverse posses-
sion is deemed to have been possessed based on any one of four 
"facts." Also, in Sec. 78-12-10, where adverse holding is 
deemed on possession exclusive of other rights, and other 
presumptions recognized by the opinion as stated in Mccready, 
together with the well known presumptions as to title by 
passage of time as in titles by prescription, by lost grant, 
and the like, appear fully to justify the trial court's judg-
ment in this case. 
II 
The respondents, in requesting a remand with instruc-
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tions to determine the matter of entitlement by way of 
contribution in tenancy-in-common cases, for payment of taxes 
and expenses innuring to the benefit of and chargeable on a 
pro-rata basis assessable against all the tenants it would 
appear, that if no one of the concurring members of the Court 
is disposed to review the Record again on appeal, as to the 
facts and the law, it should follow as a matter of course, 
that the case should be returned for such determination as to 
the equities between the tenant parties, since this is a case 
in equity. 
In the case relied on mostly by the majority opin-
ion, Mc Cready v. Frederickson, this right of contribution 
should be litigated in this case. There it was said that: 
"We think the court has power to make 
a decree quieting title . . conditionally. 
That is, the court may quiet title upon condi-
tion that he pay into court, within a time to 
oe-Tixed by it, his proportion of the taxes and 
accrued interest and such other sums as the 
court may find he should pay under the law. 
In case appellant shall pay the taxes and ac-
crued interest thereon, together with any other 
sums that the court may find legal and just, 
the title to (appellants') interest in said 
premises should be quieted in him." 
This right of contribution is acknowledged also in 
Herselt v. Herselt, cited in the majority opinion, and also 
Sperry v. Tolley, where on one tenant's payment of taxes, the 
Court said: 
"He acquires no other or greater inter-
est, except that he has a claim upon the others 
for reimbursement according to their resoective 
shares. 
-14-
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Under such circumstances the remand "for entry of 
judgment for the appellants" should be changed to provide 
"for determining the amount of contribution, plus accrued 
interest thereon and upon payment thereof, to enter judgment 
quieting title to appellants' claim of interest," - as sub-
stantially was stated in McCready v. Frederickson. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 
1982. 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
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